The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration

Dominique MAILLARD
(Department of Administration and International Trade, University of Paris XII-Val de Marne)

Abstract: Local seasonal migrations have long been common in France, and the migrations can be throughout the whole Europe. The identification and assessment of such migration in European countries trace back to 1805 under the Napoleonic Empire regime, when nationality was based on jus sanguinis (Latin, right of blood) with the ultimate purpose of ensuring sufficient recruits in the Napoleonic armies, which is unlike the Republican France today that defines nationality on the basis of jus soli (Latin, right of the soil, also known as birthright citizenship). At the beginning of the 21st century, immigration has become a major challenge to the French domestic policy, and is closely linked to the issues of public safety, national identity, labor market, development of the European Union public policy, and the integration of the second generation by the secular, republican French model. The migration within and outside of the Europe demonstrates four conceptual issues: European residents' country of origin, French nationality, the exercising of French citizenship, and the construction of a personal identity in the context of a more and more complex family ethnic composition after the restructuring.

① Dr. Dominique Maillard, vice dean of the Department of Administration and International Trade at the University of Paris XII-Val de Marne, and a researcher at the university’s Center for National Development and Economic & Social Activities.
In 2009, France officially welcomed 95,000 legal immigrants, about 5% of the total French population. This rate is lower than most major European Union countries such as Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. According to statistics available around 2005, the total number of immigrants in France then reached 4.9 million. Moreover, despite the apparent difficulty, the French Department of Immigration was able to estimate that about 200,000 to 300,000 of them were illegal immigrants. This number is in stark contrast with the estimate at the European level, and the number of illegal entries into the European areas is probably equivalent to or slightly less than the number of legal admissions. Another point worth mentioning is that during 2008, a total of 130,300 immigrants were granted French citizenship. This figure shows a rough stability in the annual number of naturalizations that oscillated between 126,341 and 131,455 during the period 1994-2000.

The construction of a modern law of nationality in France begins with the Republic: in 1790-1791, the definition of French citizenship was added into the Constitution; in 1790-1795, two ways of acquiring French citizenship were defined: either through the honorary citizenship or through automatic naturalization. In 1803, nationality was incorporated into the French Civil Code, and the definition was given based on *jus sanguinis*, rather than what Napoleon Bonaparte had hoped, *jus soli*. In fact, only during the period 1803-1889 did *jus soli* become the basis of the definition for French nationality. During the period 1889-1940, the French Republic implemented a less stringent policy in order to secure naturalization of immigrant workers, and address the aging of a population whose birth rate is insufficient due to the high mortality rate and low birth rate then, as
The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration

well as the destruction caused by the First World War. Don’t we speak of “classes creuses” (the demographic decline) when France was again mobilizing its forces against the threat posed by the rise of German National Socialism? In this respect, the Chinese workers in France during the Great War, which is the first wave of Chinese immigration in France, were undoubtedly part of a new impetus for the implementation of new French immigration policy.

Just as Patrick Weil points out, the racist policy of nationality adopted by the Vicky regime during the occupation was marked by a proposed new Code of French Nationality during 1940-1943, which was eventually aborted because of the veto of the German regime. This code, however, was proposed to prevent “the undesirable” to become French, and to denaturalize those “Jews” who had already acquired French nationality. In fact, it was not easy to repeal the “laws” of the Vicky regime after the Second World War. What George Mauco advocated during the French liberation—i.e., ethnic-based division of naturalization quota, was, despite the many criticisms it received, not repealed until the development of a new Nationality Code and the opening of a liberal naturalization policy during the period 1953-1973 (Weil, 2002: 97-163). The second ethnic crisis associated with the French nationality was linked to the independence of Algeria. The French government established laws during the decade of 1974-1984 to ensure the legal rights of North African immigrants in France, and to help realize the naturalization integration of the second generation, thus to cope with the challenges brought up by the nationality issues(Weil, 2002: 165-181).

Contrary to the popular belief, the opposition between a *jus soli*, which characterizes the French nationality, and a *jus sanguinis*, which would be the exclusive feature of German law, is indeed a false contrast. After three conflicts that affected each generation of the two countries, and the miraculous peace that lasted for 60 years since the end of World War II, this theoretical opposition has long lost its political interest. First, the desire to live together in a united Germany
came up with the fall of the wall. To quote the famous words of Ernest Renan, the restoration of freedom of movement between West Germany and the German Democratic Republic spontaneously gave rise to a true “daily plebiscite.” The German reunification was, therefore, not made in the name of the nation’s “ethnicity and culture,” as Johann Gottlieb Herder (1744-1803) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) had seen in the line of the Manifesto to the German Nobility by Martin Luther in 1520. But rather, it was made in the name of the nation’s “policy” following the French model. As pointed out by Alfred Grosser, the European Union is “an entity sui generis (i.e., particular), both well below and in many ways beyond the federal system.” (Grosser, 2005: 234). Even in the absence of a European political awareness, with regard to belonging to a European meta-nation, governments, parties and European media almost never evoke an unavoidable reality contained in the treaties, that is, the naturalization of immigrants in EU Member States. Similar to what happened in the United States and Canada in the nineteenth century, the laws of the European Union countries were dominated either by jus sanguinis, under the influence of the French Civil Code, or by jus soli, under the influence of British law. As Patrick Weil puts it, in immigration countries such as the United States or Canada, the British jus soli allows the children of immigrants automatically to acquire, at birth, American or Canadian nationality (Weil, 2002: 206). For the countries of continental Europe, most of which are countries of emigration, the French jus sanguinis, however, can help them retain the links between their nationals abroad and their children. In this regard, we note that Great Britain and Ireland, although once were countries of jus soli, did not always follow that rule loyally. When these countries in turn became the countries with many immigrants, they added the provision of jus sang uinis to maintain the legal bond they had with their nationals living abroad. Thus, when a contradiction occurs between the legislation governing nationality and the perception of the migration situation, a change also occurs, not
mechanically, but through certain processes and internal political debates in each country (Weil & Hansen, 1999).

On November 2, 1945, the French government issued a decree, expressing the fundamental principles of immigration policy, with a purpose to encourage and facilitate migration from Europe to France. As the Algerians shed blood for France during the two world wars, Algerian Muslims thus were granted the right to move freely between France and Algeria. Based on the principle of “automatic assimilation,” which means that those gained residence in France automatically became French citizens, and since Algerian Muslims in France already had French citizenship, they were exempted from having to take steps to become French. The French authorities reached a consensus over the type of organization that would allow monitoring of Algerian immigrants, so as to ensure their right to live in France. The French Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Labor were in rivalry for controlling over the management of migrants, while in principle we do not consider that, as French citizens, Algerian workers would need to be placed under the supervision of a special institution in charge with their problems. Thus, issues relating to immigrants from Algeria often involve different ministries of the French government. However, the French Ministry of Interior should play a key role as the rebellion gained momentum in Algeria and the National Liberation Front (FLN) led an Algerian war on French territory through its activists.

II

The politician Alain Juppé points out in one of his publications on the topic of immigration that France was not ready to handle the presence of four million Muslim immigrants on its territory (Juppé, 1999: 10). France and the Muslim world always have strong cultural, political and business connections in history, particularly through the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, these ties deepened during the
colonization of Algeria and parts of Africa by France in the 1830s. French colonial authorities had implemented a structural organization of the Muslim faith, and the prefects were invested significant expertise and power in the appointment of imams in the mosques of the French colonial empire. In addition, as evidenced even today in the Muslim graves in military cemeteries, around 100,000 French Muslim soldiers died for France during the First World War alone. And that is why the French colonial power, in recognition of that, erected the Paris Mosque in the heart of the capital in 1926. However, because of the presence of a small Muslim population in the metropolitan area into the 1960s, virtually no Muslim place of worship had been built since the separation of church and state in 1905. Such a small number also explains why there was no Muslim Presbytery recognized by the French government before the creation of the French Muslim Council in 1999.

The collective memory of several generations of French has been permanently marked by the colonization and decolonization of Algeria by a mixture of deleterious long repressed feelings, combined with emotional pain, humiliation and guilt. The events of November 4, 1954, and the use of terrorism on the Algerian side and torture on the French side made the war in Algeria one of the darkest pages in the history of France (Behr, 1961). The unease about the French army’s use of torture in Algeria was such that for several decades after independence from the former French colony, few books or movies had the courage to analyze in depth the “events” and the scene in the broader context of the decolonization process. The European community of Blackfoot was seen as being responsible for the Algerian “events” because of their intransigence and eagerness to defend their own interest. As a way, the mainstream French society was able to restore the reputation of its own. The French government elected on behalf of the French nation, although they failed one after another in managing the “affair” of Algeria, completely dodging their own responsibilities. French citizens in the metropolitan area easily
exempted themselves from their political responsibilities, making the Algerians victims of injustice (Grosser, 1961: June 1). The harkis—Muslim auxiliaries who had fought against their fellow insurgents alongside the French Army—were suddenly abandoned by the French military and political power. And then France cultivated for a long time the amnesia over the war in Algeria; she embraced, plowed, subjugated, exploited, fought in Algeria, and then abandoned it permanently (Jelloun, 1997: 21-22).

The French authorities became aware that the miserable living conditions of Algerian workers in France would be dramatically improved by the construction of homes, especially those for singles, to curb the feeling of revolt. Yet the number of supporters of the cause of Algerian independence never ceased to grow. Conversely, the social function to the assimilation of Algerian workers was replaced by a policy of “control,” organizing “coverage” of Algerian immigration between 1957 and 1958. The suspicion then replaced benevolence. Maurice Bougès Maunory proclaimed in 1958, “population of Algerian origin would have unwavering membership in the national community.” It was a change in perspective since this wording implied a certain distance with a group that was supposed to melt into the French population with assimilation—the Muslim community was no longer an integral part of the national community. It was bound to France as a colony to its metropolitan country. Thus, the Muslim community became heterogeneous in both senses of the word. It was a foreign body in the nation because it was composed of a different nature. And the result was that the Ministry of Interior was given the task of separating the “good” migrants from the “bad” ones (Viet, 1998: 189-190). Social considerations returned to the limelight with the political speeches of General de Gaulle on October 3, 1958 in Constantine, indicating that the Algerians were “full” French. Algerian workers who had not found a place in those homes for singles and the homeless Algerian families settled in shanty towns became stigmatized as the propaganda of the F. L. N.
At that time, about 14,000 single workers and 1,800 families of Algerian origin lived in the shanty towns of Lyons, Marseilles and suburban Paris. And statistics showed that more than 130,000 people were living not in decent housing, but in overcrowded rental housing (Viet, 1998: 204). Housing became a critical issue for the Algerian migration to France. However, the French authorities at that time only took into consideration the issue of housing for single Algerian workers; family housing was not a priority to them. However, tensions in Algeria in the 1950s had triggered migrations of Algerian families to France. Such a migration population grew from 3,000 to 20,000 people between 1953 and 1960 (Viet, 1998: 207).

These families of Algerian origin who arrived in France had no access to low-income housing (HLM) for lack of sufficient space and because of their lack of “evolution.” As a response to such a situation, banks issued special loans to build low-rent housing that these families could afford with their income. The French authorities thus hoped that they could use the improvement of the status of Algerian immigrants in France as a bargain chip in future negotiations with the F.L.N., and to secure the future status of Europeans living in Algeria. Algerian workers had become indispensable to the French economy in sectors such as public work, steel, and textiles. The Evian Agreements guaranteed the Blackfoot—referring to the European settlers because of the color of their boots at the beginning of the colonization of Algeria—their civil rights, religion, language and property in Algeria; whereas the Algerian workers on French territory were guaranteed the same rights as French citizens, apart from political rights. The free movement of migrants between the two countries formed the heart of the agreement. In fact, the principle of free movement, which was one of the levers of French policy in Africa, was extended to all African countries through a series of “special” agreements (Viet, 1998: 218).

The extension of such special arrangements of French Muslims to all the nationals of the former French Union was also in the logic of laissez-faire economics manifested in the “Glorious Thirty Years” or
“Golden Age.” It followed therefore that advocacy was logically extended to the benefits of all these new immigrants. It was sort of a positive legacy left behind by the Algerian war. The economic crisis linked to the oil shortage of the early 1970s threw the French economy into recession. The end of growth had a negative effect on social benefits to immigrants and raised concerns and questions about the immigration policy of France. Two questions were addressed: a policy of assisting immigrants’ return and illegal immigration. The immigration of labor stopped abruptly and migration flows began to decline. The laws of return assistance did not reach their goal. The major source of immigrants during the first decade of the 20th century was the “family reunion,” whose goal is to enable the workers’ family to migrate to the French territory. Note that it is a legal concept whose purpose is different from that of the family “reunification” in the United States. In the US, the family reunification is a citizen’s exercising of his civil right: American citizens have the right to be reached by his parents and some members of his family on American soil. However, the French “family reunification” mainly ensures that the immigrant worker’s wife and children remaining in the country can join the husband in France.

Nevertheless, the economic crisis of the mid 1970s put an end to the flow of legal immigrants. Thus, for the first time, immigration came to the French nation as a kind of internal colonial problem, triggering strong reactions in French politics, which partly hides the complex phenomena of mutual repulsion between the local people and the immigrants. Yet, as a group, immigrants clearly contributed to the French economic growth, the promotion of the working class to middle class, and the general prosperity of the country (France, race and immigration. Who gains?, 2002: March 2). As Fernand Braudel points out, to sacrifice a little and repay the debt that is due to the immigrants is only fair (Haut conseil à l’intégration, 1993: 12-13). Conversely, immigration has been regarded as data revealing the fundamental values of the political regime of the Republic by the
assigning of universal values to human rights, freedom, equality and fraternity. In practical terms, the immigration policies of France were built at the crossroads of three approaches: First of all, an ethic logic, which involves principles for distinguishing political asylum, labor migration, migration settlement, and provides guarantee of residence to immigrants; secondly, a demographic logic based on the principle that France needs to reach a certain population size to remain or become, once again, a world power. And finally, there is also an economic logic that leads recruiters to seek flexible, low-paid, preferably also healthy, single workers who are able to deal with the conflicting demands of different economic sectors (Weil, 1991: 28-38). In short, the French immigration policies were developed through competing choices between the “actor state” and the egalitarian principles of the republican government.

III

General de Gaulle had solemnly declared: “the ones who have lived in France are all French people.” What he was referring to was Muslims of those French people. According to the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, statistics reveal that the French has 4 to 5 million Muslims (the classification based on cultural property rather than religious activities), and about half of whom have French nationality.

There are about 3 million people from North Africa or the descendants of North African immigrants in the total Muslim population: 1.5 million are Algerian descents, about 1 million Moroccan descents and the rest Tunisian descents. Among other Muslim populations, around 0.35 million people are from Turkey, about 25 million from sub-Saharan countries, and the rest from the Middle East countries (such as Iran, Lebanon, the Kurdish region and other Arab countries). France has been an immigrant receiving country for a long time and the situation is likely to continue. The proportion of the immigrant population of France of the total
The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration

population has remained stable over many years.

In the 1980s, the idea of anti-racism had sprung up. Most of these proposals were initiated by the French Socialist Party which ended in many associations building in “suburbs” to help young Maghreb immigrants express their own political aspirations and to promote their integration into French society by providing funds and services.

However, due to the limited resources, many organizations failed to achieve the desired objectives and fulfill their mission. And then the anti-racist organizations network gradually lost its prestige. The reason is very simple which is that these organizations had no network of relationships with private owners and the executive heads of the public domain who would play a key role in the promotion of young immigrants employment. Faced with this failure, the young North African immigrants were frustrated. They had joined the Socialist Party and made efforts for the re-election of Francois Mitterrand in the 1988 presidential election which made their disappointment increasingly strong (Kepel, 1994: 229-241). According to the survey, the French Muslim citizens had little effect on the election results both to the National Assembly elections and local elections in the 1980s, because only the Muslims with French nationality had the voting right. French municipal authorities used a variety of administrative measures to reject the devout Muslims’ request of building mosques in order to avoid the dissatisfaction of European voters. Candidates for local elections had given their pre-election promises to the young North Africans. However, as long as they were elected, they would take advantage of their own pre-emptive rights to buy the land which could be expected to build a mosque. This behavior violated the “secularism law” published on December 9, 1905 and the concept of freedom of religious belief. The first-generation Muslim immigrants were very disappointed and this mood gradually affected the younger generation. Young radical Islamists took the opportunity to expand their influence and prestige in the Muslim population. It is a still a traumatic memory for Algerian
immigrants and their children who have been born in France to remember the humiliation of the French colonial period and the French atrocities in the Algerian War of Independence. Meanwhile, the leaders of the National Liberation Front in Algeria held a solemn memorial service for the “1500 thousand martyrs” who dedicated themselves to the business of independence, which has further deepened the group consciousness of the ethnic Albanians on that historical memory. The victims were mainly civilians, despite that the “1500 thousand” figure is not in line with the actual situation (in fact, the number of victims is closer to 300 thousand), but almost every family in Algeria has been implicated, at least one family member was affected in the continuing seven years of war. In addition, these painful memories created a favorable environment for “Front Islamic Salvation” (FIS) to promote hostility toward the French cultural ideas spreading among the people in Algeria and let them reject the degraded Western lifestyle and the Western political system which was far from the Koranic doctrine. The Front Islamic Salvation was founded in the Ben Baidis de Kouba mosque in March 1989. A few months before that, the popular uprising broke out in Algeria in October 1988. The Front Islamic Salvation captured the indisputable right to speak in the rapid spread of Islam, became the leading force of social cohesion and ultimately controlled Algerian politics. Most of the Islamic preachers in Algeria were subjected to the front authority and their religious philosophy of Islam was the only correct interpretation. From the social aspect, the Front implemented a series of charitable relief measures to meet the requirements of the Algerian people at the lowest level, while the mosques became the entire community centers responsible for the distribution of financial assistance and provisions. The Front’s social strategy had an immediate effect which was greatly conducive to the political intention of the Front. In 1990, the Front got a landslide victory in municipal elections; in 1991, they won the first round of parliamentary elections again. However, the smooth development of the political process was suspended because of the
The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration

military intervention in 1992. During the period of the Front Islamic Salvation, almost every Algerian had a brother or a cousin living in France, or who had lived in France. Algerians could access foreign exchanges through property and the paid services market. At the same time, each Algerian immigrant living in France had relatives or family members who voted for the Front Islamic Liberation in 1990 or 1991. And their relatives often vented dissatisfaction and disappointment to the 1992 military coup. The Front “demonizing” propaganda of the French and influence spread in the same family members living in a different world, and provided them with the surrounding environment which was diametrically opposed to their political ideas and beliefs. Thus, the political propaganda had a strong impact on the daily life and future of citizens of Algeria, people who had settled in France and their children, descendants of immigrants born in France and ethnic Algerians and the second-generation children of immigrants with French nationality. For the “French cultural property” of Algeria, the Front Islamic Salvation implemented radical policies of pure Islamic identity and banning all the French-related knowledge and language contact. Through the implementation of cultural tyranny, the Front maintained strict control and redefined the national identity of Algeria according to Islamism to abandon the desecration of religion and the impact of the criminal world. The most radical factions of the Front called Salafi which are famous for complying with the ancient Islamic tradition and the pious ancestors. This faction has had support from some Muslim religious figures that have taken refuge in France and have promoted their propositions in mosques of France. Salafi argued that most Algerians had been influenced by superstitious “le marabout doctrine”, some miscreant religious activities and French culture. Therefore, the Front intended to achieve several objectives: reconstruction of individual believers, society transformation and an Islamic regime establishment. There have been mutual fusions among Arab, Berber, French, Marabou, socialism and secularism in post-independence Algeria. If Salafi has
achieved its goal, it must have an outright rupture with those mixed post-colonial culture. Meanwhile, the most terrible poisons of the hateful legacy of French colonialism have been that: the first is the separation of religion from politics which is the greatest danger of Islam, especially in schools; the second is democracy. From the theoretical point of view, the Front’s purpose is to “crack the “skull” of Democratic doctrine” which is borrowed from expressions in the 21st prophet of “the Koran”. They believed that democracy was originated from the desecration of religion by God as a human’s “scum”. Moreover, democracy is defined as “popular sovereignty” which is completely incompatible with Islam’s “God has supreme power”. The latter is the most radical Islamist doctrine. From the realities of Algeria, it is more difficult to maintain democratic principles and institutions. Although the Front National Liberation used to vow to defend democracy, it was the Front National Liberation that forcibly prevented the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 and suspended the democratic process in Algeria (Kepel, 1994: 234-238).

In 1999, after his two predecessors Pierre Chevènement and Daniel Viallant, the Minister of the Interior and Religious Affairs Nicolas Sarkozy personally promoted the establishment of the French Muslim Religious Council and got the ultimate success. According to the 1999 statistics, there were 4.3 million immigrants in France in that year, accounting for 7.4% of the total population. The ratio 1/4 has been unchanged for a century. In addition, over 1/3 of the immigrants have obtained French nationality.

The destruction of the balance between the two modes is bound to affect the mainstream ideology in France and the compromise between a universal sense of “equality, karyoplasm family” and the hierarchic idea of “ancestral home” model. The universal significance of French culture lies in its central provinces with the spirit of equality. But in Europe, and even in the world, French culture is a special entity, which must rely on the characteristic edge provinces to find its source and survival root (Todd, 1994: 226-228). According to the French
particularity, the founding of the High Commission for Immigrants Integration emphasized that “integration” is not the middle phase of “absorption” and “merger”, but is a special process. According to this definition, the Committee recommended that the concept of individual equality replaces the equality of “ethnic group” which can be seen as a continuation of the principles and characteristics of the French republican tradition. In fact, the French Republic contract has been established on the basis of protecting citizens’ individual rights, and then protecting minorities’ collective rights. Nevertheless, the value of Republican philosophy has not decreased (Weil, 1999: 16-17).

IV

During the French colonial period, in the view of the French colonists, the human culture system of the Algerians (whether Arab or Berber), is the entire denial of their own nuclear substance quality, equality and bilateral pattern. The Algerian group practice population doctrine, patrilineal descent and marriage within the faith mean that women would be under arrest within their home. The customs cannot be compatible with the French colonists whether the latter comes from the French center of nuclear substance, the principle of egalitarian family, or from the edge of the provinces implementing the “ancestral family”. The differences of two family systems increased political hostility between the colonizers and the colonized ones. The Algerian tendency of marriage within the faith must be a conflict if the colonizers and the colonized want to get married. The intermarriage and bilateral principle of French colonists is established on the equal footing. It is the obligation to find a mate out of the ethnic group. So they could not accept patrilineal descent and marriage within the faith. French women in the spotlight represent the moral equality and independence as the French point of view, and in the eyes of Algerians these were Western "barbarians" in indecent performance. In addition, the common points of the two opposing ideas made the situation
worse. In fact, these two cultures both believed that “brotherhood” has equality which deducts two respective interpretation of universal “human being”. The two ethnic groups have been convinced that a universal “human being” exists, but cannot agree with each other’s family organization patterns and social behavior. In the mind of Algerians, the “l’homme universel” has a higher status than “sister”. As long as he asked, he can immediately marry his “cousin”.

In contrast, French people think that the “l’homme universel” has the same position with “sister.” He must find a mate outside the group. If he had got married, he and his wife will always comply with the “contract.” Algeria and France have their own apriori principles and both take the other side as a heresy which deeply rooted in their religious beliefs. Because of this, during the French colonization in Algeria, the proportion of mixed marriages was very low whether among the Arabs or in Berber people of the Kabylie. In 1955, Algeria under the rule of France had only 0.5% of European-American men married to Muslim women and 1% of European-American women married to Muslims (Todd, 1994: 294-296). Until 2010, the core issue within Algerian immigrants of France has been how to urge the first generation of immigrants, especially the second generation who was born and educated in France to leave their traditional modes of human culture with the help of the pressure of French family patterns. To solve this problem, they should first face the potential hostile attitude towards Muslim immigrants, because many natives in French society cannot tolerate differences in customs.

Public security and crime are difficult problems to solve in EU countries including France. Certain sectors who control the French public opinion did not hesitate to link these issues with immigration on the grounds that “the difficult to manage countryside” which they have outlined overlaps the concentrated areas of immigrant families.
Thus they condemn immigrants and their children as being involved in gangs, drug trafficking, gang activity or heinous crimes. Some Muslim young men were accused of rape in such a collective way and were believed that their motivation is to complete some barbaric rituals which aim to punish those young girls who according to Islamic custom were identified to be profligate and frivolous by a Muslim “brother” (A Survey of France. A question of colour, a matter of faith. France must face up to its immigrant problems, 2002: November 16). On the contrary, the vast majority of immigrants actively embrace the personal incentives of France. Most French Muslims give more consideration to the maintenance of their own interests, rather than the pursuit of Islamic purity. Meanwhile, if young Muslims married the French, they will soon be accepted by their spouse’s family. As long as they are willing to do that, they will not be in the shackles of their parents’ culture. In addition, inter-ethnic marriages in the second generation of immigrants are not uncommon for the Islamic faith, and that would not stop them to accept their husbands or wives who are infidels. This may be seen as a “blasphemous” act which has led to several killings of young Muslim girls in France, while the mastermind of the crime turned out to be the parents of these girls, because they believed that it is a great insult for a family to marry infidels. According to statistics, there are about one hundred thousand Muslim girls growing up in France who were forced to marry their husbands who are often chosen by their parents when they were on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. However, not all Muslim women are subservient to their fate. Some of them learned how to fight against those unfair behaviors which violate their privacy and persecute them, relying on such ideas as "no prostitutes, no slaves" obtaining associations such rights. The purpose of these organizations is to defend the right to equality generated by the civil rights of the French. Overall, the social behavior of the French equality and the supremacy of individual were deeply into the hearts of immigrant children and led them to doubt the traditional values of their families.
At least, it may try to play against the role of Salafi.

Schools and education systems are at the forefront of realizing the French values of immigrants' children. In a sense, schools are also the main fronts for the children to get into the society, have a successful career, and ultimately realize their individual values. From this perspective, the situation of boys in the second generation of the Maghreb immigrants is more complicated than that of girls. The former means the loss of the original dominant position in the family and the latter hopes to improve young Muslim women's position in the French society and get out of the traditional family model. As the French girls of European descent, girls in the second generation of the Maghreb region have more academic achievements than their older brothers. This may be due to the severe restraint they have gotten from their brothers, or just because they are very clear that the school is their only opportunity to find a foothold in French society and then change their destiny. However, the school is not a “skeleton key”, especially in those “sensitive” suburbs. Since civil unrest in 2005, there have been increasingly frequent frictions between immigrants and the police because of misdeeds or routine inspections of the latter. The famous Moroccan writer Takhar Ben Jay pointed out that the proportion of the immigrants' children going to college is just 4%, while the French children of European descent are up to 25% (A Survey of France. A question of colour, a matter of faith). France must face up to its immigrant problems. Besides the barriers in education, the implicit discrimination policy of employment in the private sector should also be noted. Although France has the system of anonymous resumes, in equivalent conditions one named Jean Pierre or Mariana is much easier to get a job in French companies than an Abdul Karim or Samira.

The principle of equality always has difficulties to solve racial prejudice and factual discrimination. Young immigrants are not so special from the surface; in fact, there are some differences with their peers of European descent. They are discriminated against by the
already disunited society. It is not easy to help those young people. In other words, the French communitarianism is not the right solution at the political level. In any case, the French government would not make decisions according to “racial and cultural property,” but according to the “individual” citizens. The regime derives its legitimacy from the individual citizens as atoms which constitutes to the national and political power of the French Republic. The Republic is a convergence of individual citizens, not “the highest form of different community groups.” (Ramonet, 1992: 17-24).

On the other hand, the construction of mosques in France also involves a funding problem. According to the “secularism law” of 1905, the funds cannot be paid by the French public authorities. And there would be a controversial issue if France takes the fund from abroad for the construction of Muslim places, because people expressed doubts about the relationship between the Muslim society in France and Middle Eastern countries including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein. The leaders of those countries have made smart use of the secularism in France to expand their influence and prestige in the Muslim minority of France with strong financial resources. Since the French public authorities cannot provide financial assistance to build the mosques, the rich Middle East countries have filled the vacancy to help the Muslim in France generously. No matter how well the local authorities treat the French Muslim immigrants, at the moment, they could do nothing but involve in repair maintenance of the mosque. On the contrary, those foreign governments are completely legitimate to finance the construction and maintenance of mosques. The French authorities have no right to assess and control the total amount (Haut conseil à l’intégration, 1995: 37). The Haut Conseil à l’Intégration has pointed out that when the representatives of some hostile Muslim countries have been suddenly friendly to the French Muslim communities, the underlying intention is to control the Association of Muslim immigrants, mosques and their broadcasting stations in France. The
Gabriel Harvey School in Paris suburban town Créteil expelled three female students on October 5, 1989 for wearing the Islamic headscarves, which triggered an “Islamic headscarf crisis” and prompted a re-examination of the immigration assimilation policy. The scope of the debate is from the mosque extending to the public schools and the principle of secularism which prohibits wearing any obvious religious symbols. This debate triggered by the Islam scarf let foreign influences into the internal affairs of France, such as the rights of Muslim citizens and the identity of the Islamic values for young Muslims who accept their French education. In fact, the latter question is a response of young Muslims to all aspects of social life in France and their aspirations to participate in international affairs. The Islamic headscarf of “Créteil issue” does have symbolic significance which is mainly because it led people to think about two major social issues: the status of women in French society and secularism. The result of these two intertwined issues is likely to become the driving force of the Fitna Movement, namely a moderate and modern Islamic movement to weaken the power of Salafi and other radical Islamic ideas in the Muslim groups. However, the Muslim groups fight against French government who ban the wearing of hijab (which is a robe only exposing the eyes), because they believed that the ban tramples the civil rights and the personal liberty of French Muslim citizens.

Islamic headscarves in public places became a symbol of status and community attributes and a special symbol of the Muslim rights. The Council of State delivered a verdict on November 27, 1989 that students’ individual freedoms includes the expression of personal religious freedom in schools on the condition that they respect others’ freedom and the principles of cultural diversity, cannot undermine the teaching activities, and not interfere with student learning. In this case, the principals would take the risk of punishment by the administrative court after losing the lawsuit. In addition, the provisions of non-religious executive power in some public places would lose its
uniqueness (Kepel, 1994: 252-258).

Since the beginning of the crisis, the leader of the anti-racist organizations “SOS Racisme” and other leftist organizations which are close to the French Socialist Party believed that three Muslim girls were expelled from school because of their religion; thus they started a clear-cut struggle against discriminatory and racist behavior. However, with a series of related events, “SOS Racisme” advocated the “right to difference” slogan which was very popular over the past changing to “the difference to the right” because hijab has the Islamic symbolism and was banned by the government. The development process of the US civil rights movement was the same. First, the African American, South Americans and progressive whites united for equal rights and at the same time “Black Panthers” and other more radical groups had gradually been active in the US political arena. The French anti-racism campaign had abandoned their original idea in the 1980s which gave an opportunity for the young Muslim immigrants who were born and educated in France to be re-educated by Muslim values. The North African immigrants gradually become very concerned about their Islamic identity in the 1990s. Although they were born and educated in France, they still could not accept secularism leading to ban Muslim girls wearing headscarves in public middle and high schools which made them feel uneasy and at risk. No matter how important their true religion was to them, they all believed that secularism has been more tolerant to the Jewish and Christian students. With strong political support and media power, they have worried that supporters of the French secularism would in the name of fighting against “fundamentalists” which actually carries out racist and xenophobic activities only with a low profile.

If going deep in this “Créteil issue”, we would find that it has changed its initial direction. When those young Muslims have felt that they are identified as potential "fundamentalists" from the beginning, no matter how obvious it is, it would encourage them to resist such groundless allegations and rise to defend their dignity. The Gulf War
in 1991 confirmed this fact. Although France disagreed with the US “war on terror” and also did not participate in military operations in the invasion of Iraq in 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attack and the French NATO troops were stationed in Afghanistan, the revolt of young Muslim immigrants has been increasingly strong and has had global development trends. In 1996, it was Bin Laden who first called for a "jihad" in the Muslim world to fight against the United States and Israel. Since then, this "jihad" has extended to the "new crusade" and "infidels" fighting against Europe which caused a great resonance in the suburbs of France. Bin Laden’s graffiti on the walls of the buildings has been regarded as a heroic defense of the Muslim world. Such graffiti even appeared in the French public middle and high schools. In order to strengthen its special relationship with African “Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI),” “Al-Qaeda” gradually expanded its activities to neighboring areas of France with frequent hostage-taking incidents. The AQMI obtain funds mainly rely on ransom, and it has had an amazing high efficiency on recruiting new members. It promotes Islamic extremist ideology worldwide. A 78-year-old French humanitarian worker in Niger was abducted and killed by this organization in August 2010. In September, two days after the French Senate approved the ban of wearing the Islamic burqa in all public places, several French experts who were involved in the development of the Niger uranium were hijacked.

VI

In short, the Anglo-Saxon principles of cultural diversity defined Islam as a special group which needs protection of their common interests as a collective group. However, many people believe this definition is a violation of French secularism. France began to re-confirm its historical origins of the "secular" nature, and the principle of secularism which was inherited from the French Revolution in the 18th century. From a practical point of view, the
The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration

legislative and judicial debate caused by the Islamic headscarf seems to be an individual case. For Muslim interests, nowadays exposed bodies are quite common in advertising and the media. In a society where a moral bottom-line continues to be broken, since the act of indulgence and exhibitionism can be accepted, the argument of the legality of wearing the Islamic headscarf seems to be more outdated. However, in the “unique and indivisible” French Republic, wearing the Islamic headscaves and burqa cannot be accepted, because the basis for the establishment of the Republic is not “the highest community groups.” Muslim women raised the aspiration of religious freedom and individual rights, whether they are sincere or not, rights which are all based on “equal state” and democratic principles, and are opposed to a “meddler country”. Regardless of their ability to defend the faith or to decide that wearing headscaves or burqa, as long as their fathers and brothers do not force them by religious purposes, wearing what kind of clothes or jewelry is only their own business. Since secularism has become a Republican principle, there is no need to recognize and strengthen it by law. Montesquieu had a famous saying: “useless laws will weaken the force of law.” In short, the secularism system could only follow a famous statement by Clermont-Tonnerre who stated the acceptance of Jews: “deprive the collective right of any community, give all the rights of individuals!”

References


① The French is “Il faut tout refuser aux Juifs comme nation et tout accorder aux Juifs comme individus”.

23


