Abstract: This article probes the Islamic Revolution of Iran from Khomeini’s ideas on the mosque, including his perception, adherence and upholding of Islam, so as to disclose the relevance of the mosque’s channel and Iran’s domestic and foreign policy, and then highlights the impact of the spiritual leader in Iran. Particularly, the international community should address the Four Kinds of Discourse that formed during the Iranian nuclear issue, which have hindered the communication and dialogue. Therefore, the international community must expand the space and means to take effective countermeasures to create an atmosphere of communication and dialogue, and then strive to resolve the issue.

Key Words: Four Kinds of Discourses; Iranian Nuclear Issue; Khomeini Revolution; Mosques; Spiritual Leader

"Mosque is the symbol of Islamic culture and the shrine and spiritual place for all Muslims. With their unique style and form, Mosques in Iran had experienced all the glories and sufferings of the
Iranian Muslims in their long history, and placed all their hopes and good wishes. Therefore, the mosque truly becomes the political, economic, cultural, educational and social center for the Iranian people. For a long time, the life of the Iranian people has been closely linked with the mosque. “Where is the Muslim, there is the Mosque.” (Wang, 2003). According to statistics, there are about 80,000 mosques in Iran. The holy city of Qom which has been known as the Iranian" religious capital” has more than 150 mosques with different styles. Most of Qom’s seminaries have been together with mosques and are protected by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The holy city of Qom had trained a group of Shiite Islamic clerics, most of whom had become the backbone of opposition faction against the Pahlavi dynasty, and led a shocked-world Islamic revolution in the late 20th century. Therefore, from the knowledge of Ayatollah Khomeini’s relationships to the mosque, we could further unscramble the Islamic Revolution of Iran in order to highlight the relevance between the mosque pipeline and the internal and external affairs of Iran, and thus highlight the far-reaching influence of the spiritual leader on the Iranian nuclear issue. The international community should address the special situation of Iran and try to take effective countermeasures.

I. Ayatollah Khomeini’s Basic Recognition on Mosque

In the 1970s, Ayatollah Khomeini published a representative named Faqih government, and the second edition changed its name to Islamic government, in which, his "rule of Shariah scholars and Islamic government" has been illuminated systematically. His basic recognition of mosques included: First, the places for religious ritual of Islam, in fact is the place for political discourse (Khomeini, 1981: 338-339). It was based on the following reasons: 1. it has espousal of the basic principle "Islamic and politics cannot be separated". The thought of “praying to Allah to give great reward in this world and here after” had been understood by Khomeini that Islam does not balance the mind and matter, soul and body, "Faramita and Temporality,” "go out of the secularity" and "go into the secularity", 
but put more importance is placed on the latter, which is the essence of Islam. The Prophet himself was a great statesman, strategist and thinker. Thus, Khomeini envisaged that "the Islamic government is neither dictatorship nor authoritarian, but constitutional. The so-called constitutional does not mean the usual sense of majority vote of the people, but the management and enforcement of the rulers have been restricted by a series of legal constraints from the holy "Koran" and the tradition of the Prophet."

2. The clerics should be from the mosque to the community. Khomeini demonstrated from the Shia doctrine that the role of Shariah scholars is not only the explanation of the holy law, but also its implementation. Therefore, he advocated that the clerics should go out from the mosque to a broad community. They not only love the religion, but also love the country and people. It is not only necessary to engage in religious events, judicial affairs, education and other important areas, but also to be against non-Islamic "oppressors". Only in this way, the Islamic law could be possible to guide each person and the whole Islamic government. In fact, Khomeini himself was not only a religious scientist, but also a political leader, national hero and anti-government fighter.

3. To achieve Islamic political ideals led by Faqih (Islamic jurist). Khomeini believed that any government is illegal during the twelfth Imam period. Their illegality is not only because they are "non-Imam" regime, but also because they are the oppressors of the regime. The Prophet, Imam Hussein, and Imam Hassan are all opposed to the oppression of the sovereign government. Therefore, "in order to prevent the decline of Islam and the shelving of the Islamic law, Shariah scholars must be the leaders of the people." He believed that Iran's religious leadership is the true foundation of independence and freedom, but not religious scholars who monopolized political power. The Shariah scholars have the right of legislative oversight and the highest decision-making power. They achieve the group leadership in equality and specific management business is to be operated by the experts and the bureaucracy.

4. To manipulate the public opinion and strengthen the Islamic
voice, Khomeini required “monitoring and preventing the press and printing media from the right direction and from the betrayal of national interests. It should be condemned by Islam and the common sense to lead the young men and women to the destruction of Western ‘freedom’; it should be prohibited to listen, write, speak, and publish articles against Islam and the behaviors against the moral and ethical principles and national interests. "In his view, university graduates suffered by the educational and cultural imperialism becoming government officials would introduce the county toward the Western cultural development track. Radio, television, print media and cinema have become used tools to be against the Islamic culture and paralyzed the country to its complete destruction. Therefore, one of the important measures to prevent the infiltration of Western culture is to publicize Islamic culture to the Iranian youth on the Fridays at the mosque.

Second, the mosque has the function of political activities and connects prayer and politics together (Khomeini, 1981: 130-131, 341). The followings are reasons on the idea of prayer and politics: 1. Religious leaders bear the dual mission of religion and politics. Khomeini believed that the life experiences and political careers of the Prophet and Imam Ali proved the inseparability of Islam and politics. The Prophet stressed that "the closest place to Allah is the mosque" and prayer as one of the rukun is "the essence of Islam." Therefore, not only ordinary Muslims should attach great importance to the mosque’s collective worship, and even the well-known scholars are also very concerned about the impact of this ritual. The Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also wrote The Philosophical Significance of the Worship and other books. Khomeini opposed the mosque’s Imam who only concentrated on worship and ignored the social and political issues. If they only care about the soul and do not participate in state affairs management, it will "lead to the destruction of Muslim countries and open the door to the bloody colonialists."

2. Emphasis on the legitimacy of the Islamic regime of Imam. He believed that Islamic law is perfect, holy as well as infinite and eternal in time and place. However if there were no government institutions
to ensure the implementation of divine law, then chaos and anarchy would prevail. The Prophet himself had founded and led the Islamic government and still needed the Imam to continue to uphold the Islamic regime after the Prophetic period. Khomeini thought that "Islam and the government is the sacred Islamic unity which ensures the prosperity of present and future well-being. It can eliminate unfair and autocratic, oppressive and corrupt and help humanity to achieve a noble goal. "In the Khomeini view, the reason that the Umayyad and the Abbasids were not the real Islamic government is because these two dynasties were the non-Imam" oppressors "regime".

3. The devout believer should be a defender of Islam. Khomeini believed that, during the "reclusion" period of the twelfth Imam, the Muslims could not only passively wait but should do what the imam wanted them to do, which was namely the establishment of the fair Islamic rule. They also faced important practical choice: either become enemies or defenders of Islam, it is the alternative. Khomeini called on Muslims to take collective action to overthrow the government oppressors, and strive to become a true defender of Islam. Thus, for each ordinary Muslim, the uniform act of worship in mosque has been a strong proof to defend the Islamic regime.

Third, the lead prayer should mobilize and organize people when religious and social activities are held in the mosque (Khomeini, 1981: 37, 49, 96, 219). Khomeini’s claims include: 1. Making use of the Shiah Ulama educational and emulation system to mobilize and organize the public. Ulama both "refers to the prestigious Shariah scholars and doctrines, under the leadership of the judges, proposed” fatwas" (opinions or judgments) on civil disputes and national issues and “the institution composed of the Shariah scholars and the doctriners is often under government control." (Jin, 2006: 286). According to the Shiah doctrine, the people who have no enlightenment should imitate the pioneer in every aspect of the private and public life. Therefore, ordinary Muslims follow the Imam, ordinary Imams follow the Ulama, Ulama follow Mujtahid, Mujtahid follow Ayatollah, Ayatollah follow Grand Ayatollah. If an Ulama who has more imitators and more audience; then the higher his position, the higher the greater the
impact. Every Shiite Muslims must follow the example of a Mujtahid in the living region; believers also can change someone else to follow. This relationship of followship formed the educational system of Shiite Ulama, during which "the Grand Ayatollah" is the highest prestige of religion, thus it has the power to mobilize and organize people. Because the Ulama is based on the Quran and use public discussion, analogy and other methods of rational thinking methods to manage issues, which undoubtedly formed their own innovation and vitality of Islam and excavated and increased the vitality of Islam in the context of authority and tradition.

2. Making use of the Shiite Imam principles of faith to encourage the public to join the Islamic revolution. In addition to worship of Allah, "the Koran" and the Prophet Muhammad, the basic characteristic of Shia is to believe Imam one and was given for the creed. The Islam world believed that Imam was the leader of the Muslim world after Mohammed. Its power should belong to Ali and his descendants. Imams both "refer to the worshipers standing in front of collective Muslim prayers" and "Imam mosque "as well as" Sunni Muslim leader" or the famous religious scholars and founders of teaching school" (Jin, 2006: 283). Shiites believed that Imam was the intermediary between Allah and the people. During the Imam reclusive period, the Shariah scholars according to the Imam principles and lessons to manage Muslim political and religious matters.

3. Worshipers use the special cultural field for the hearts and minds of people. As Shiites have faith and respect for the imam, and there were several imams murdered by political opponents, so people believed that these imams are both exceptional leaders and the martyrdom of the martyrs. They respect the tomb and often pay homage to mourn the martyrs. Shi'ites considered Ali, Hussein and other Imams as Saints and their tombs as shrines. The followers worship at the shrine regularly. Especially in the annual Ashir, the famous Shiite mosques would hold various commemorative activities. The Shiites are a minority in numbers and Ali and Hussein were both murdered, at the same time, the Shia has experienced a long history of
persecution, so the Shiites have a strong psychological suffering and cohesion. Therefore, the most focused way to show their fanatical religious sentiments has been the self-flogging mourning in the annual Ashir.

4. The pilgrimage is not only a religious but political affairs (Khomeini, 1981: 130, 196-197, 237, 275, 341). The idea of "exporting the Islamic revolution" was also expressed in Khomeini's politicalized pilgrimage to Mecca, which includes: 1) To use all available opportunities to spread Iranian-style "Islamic revolution". For the Sunni leader, the Saudi state was the prefect destination. Khomeini believed that Islam is not only a revolutionary means but the purpose; Islam is serving for Iran, and Iran should also serve Islam. In other words, Islam is both a national and international doctrine. The Islamic nationalism and internationalism rely on each other to form an organic unity. After the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, it should expand its influence to the world. There is no boundary in the Islamic world; Iran should export the Islamic revolution. On March 21, 1980, the Iranian New Year, Khomeini said: "We must strive to export our revolution and should not give up ...... all the super powers want our destruction. If we stayed in the closed environment, we will certainly face defeat." So his diplomatic idea of "not East, not West, but Islam" reflects both the Iranian people’s hatred and resistance to the hegemony of the US and USSR and the expansionism, and dissatisfaction and disappointment to the international society controlled by the superpower and the West, but it also permeated with the ambitions of regional hegemony. After choosing the target country Saudi Arabia, Khomeini’s speaking videos and leaflets had been smuggled into Saudi Arabia; 2) Iranian pilgrims have been required to engage in political activities during the Hajj period and fight against the enemies of Islam through demonstrations, which deteriorated the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini had different views with Saudi Arabia on the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. Ayatollah Khomeini and other religious leaders believed that the Hajj is a gathering of Muslims around the world, and everything can be talked about, including political issues. Even the
pilgrimage is a political act. But the Saudi Arabia side thought that the Hajj is only a religious activity and should not be involved in political issues. On December 4, 1979, 75 Iranian Muslims who controlled the Mecca mosque were killed by Saudi police. Dozens of Saudi soldiers were also killed in the gun battle; On July 31, 1987, Iranian pilgrims held anti-American demonstrations and had conflicts with the police. 402 pilgrims died and 649 were injured in the conflict, mostly Iranians; On July 9, 1989, two bombs exploded in Mecca killing one person and injuring 16. Saudi authorities blamed that the Iranians supported those terrorists, particularly in November 1979. the Mecca mosque was seized and occupied by Sunni militants or up to two weeks long who had hated monarchy of Saudi Arabia. Khomeini accused the US of having an affair with the matter, which led frequent attacks against the US embassy. All of the above worsened relations between the two Islamic countries; 3) After the Islamic Revolution, Iran and Saudi relations have encountered great difficulties. In Khomeini’s view, every issue in Saudi Arabia including religious services was subject to the US intervention and Saudi Arabia no longer believed in the "real, Muhammad Islam" but "the US Islam". The ruling regime in Saudi Arabia dressed in Muslim coats but represented a luxurious, frivolous and shameless way of life. They extracted wealth from the hands of the people and have profligate day “indulging in gambling, booze and merrymaking.” (Esposito, 1999: 24). In order to save Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the revolution must be exported to Saudi Arabia. In the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf monarchies provided Iraq with billions of dollars in loans or grants, and helped Iraq to export oil and import goods, which exacerbated the conflicts between Iran and the Gulf countries, especially with Saudi Arabia (Fan, 2006).

The Saudi Arabia government has a Muslim clergy team with Ulama (including mosque imams) as the backbone. "This religious networks gives political and moral 'legitimacy' to the Saudi monarchy, and attracted Saudi Muslims and their residents around the Saudi government to ensure long-term stability; in the process of spreading and promoting Islam, the influence of Saudi dynasty has been
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expanded in the Muslim world and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has become the leader in the Muslim world” (Wang, 2008). Therefore, the government had been quietly alert to Ayatollah Khomeini’s "exporting the Islamic revolution and the establishment of an Islamic world order", especially spiritual leaders of Iran have the Islamic political acts that make anxious relations with Saudi Arabia neighboring Sunni countries and affect the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia. On November 14, 1988, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Besa Lahti said that Iran was willing to consult the "big misunderstanding" with Saudi Arabia since 1987 pilgrimage tragedy. Saudi Arabia made a positive response. It was reported that Saudi King Fahd had ordered radio announcers and newspapers to stop attacking Iran, and was willing to resolve all major disputes between the two countries (Tarock, 1999: 156). Saudi King Abdul formally invited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to participate in the pilgrimage to Mecca in December 2007. The two countries developed better trends of communication and cooperation. In short, from Khomeini’s view of the mosque is to see the spiritual basis and guiding thought of Khomeini’s revolution which aims to further realize the important influence formed by Khomeini’s revolution thought to the mosque culture, particularly to Iran and the world. Khomeini held, supported and made use of the mosque which proved its special and important role in the development and success of the Khomeini revolution.

II Khomeini Holding, Supporting and Making Use of the Mosque

Mosques in Iran are not only substantial, but also have an evenly developed attraction based in the holy city and the capital to cities and villages around the nation, and form a mosque network. Therefore, the reason that the unarmed Khomeini could overthrow the Pahlavi government and establish the Islamic theocratic government was that he called on mosques to unite Shiites at home and abroad: after he launched the White Revolution in 1963, in the name of land reform, Pahlavi deprived a number of the mosque's land holdings, which
violated the religious interests and led the revolutionary struggle against the White Revolution. In March 1963, Khomeini gave a speech in a Qom mosque to crusade against "oppressive government", and then triggered the wave of the national anti-government; in October 1965, he continued to guide the domestic struggle against the monarchy in Najaf seminary of Iraq; in 1970, he was supported to be the Shia leader by 48 Iran's ayatollahs and with the help of the mosque pipeline, he sent personnel and delivered speech records to the domestic clerics to struggle against the government;

On October 30, 1967, the sudden death of Khomeini’s eldest son triggered demonstrations of Iran Ulama, Baza merchants and students as well as the general public, but it was dispersed by the police. On January 7, 1978, an article attacking Khomeini on Izvestia aroused 4,000 students in the Qom seminary protesting on the streets and the police opened fire on demonstrators and killed about 70 and injured 400, which is called the "tragedy of Qom". According to the Islamic tradition, a memorial would be held on the fortieth day after death. On February 18, 1978, the fortieth day after the "Qom tragedy," there were 12 cities with demonstrations against the Shah. The army had more than 100 demonstrators killed and 600 injured; after forty days, 12 major cities took place in demonstrations again on March 20, and caused new casualties; after another forty days, there were 35 cities having riots on May 11. The "every 40 day memorial service which relied on the mosque had mobilized the masses many times.” The outstanding point of Ayatollah Khomeini's power lies in the fact that he made full use of religious festivals to mobilize and organize the mass. (Wang & Jin, 2004: 345). In August 1978, the prayer leader used Ayatollah Khomeini's tapes to give a Ramadan sermon in a mosque in order to preach against the Shah's tyranny, which greatly raised people's political consciousness. On September 8, 1978, 15,000 Iranians demonstrated in Tehran and the army opened fire on demonstrators and 87 people were killed and 205 injured, which is called the "Black Friday" massacre. Khomeini who was exiled in Paris called for "the fortieth day condolences activity “and asked seminary students and Ulama to publicize that: "the Islamic revolution stands on the side of
the poor and the side of farmers." In consequence, more than 100 million people took part in demonstrations on the streets of Tehran in December 1978 and adopted the resolution that: Ayatollah Khomeini was supported as the leader of a country and overthrew the monarchy to establish an Islamic government. The Shah left on January 16, 1979; Khomeini returned to Iran from Paris on February 1, 1979, and Iran's Islamic Revolution was a great success.

It is worth mentioning that the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini was busy teaching, writing, giving speeches and statements and paying close attention to political developments in Iran to support the anti-Shah activities, to establish contacts with the Iranian students in Europe and meet with the Palestinian LTTE delegation as well as engaging in theoretical research. At the same time, clerics in the country still received charity fees in the name of Ayatollah Khomeini and gave them to Khomeini’s brother to manage. The funds were not only used to support the clergy, mosques, Islamic seminary students and cultural activities, but also funded opposition political activities. People who supported Khomeini established the initial network of contacts through the major mosques and there were many separate activities of Islamic societies.

In addition, Khomeini kept in touch with the anti-Shah activities through letters. The large and small mosques in Iran naturally became the anti-government strong hold of the Islamic revolution. When Khomeini’s speeches, works, and letters were brought back to Iran and spread through the mosques, he was pushed to the forefront of the political arena. His voice could be heard and pictures could be seen in the streets. The Islamic Revolution’s great success was the result of several factors. The economic crisis provided the backdrop for the revolution; Migrants from the countryside coming into the city provided enormous power for the revolution; 80,000 mosques and religious institutions spread around the country provided the organizational foundation; the role of Khomeini and his political views cohered and strengthened the revolutionary forces; Baza merchants provided the necessary funds; the nationwide strikes battered the Pahlavi dynasty; the United States forced the Shah to
implement a "liberal policy" which gave birth to the opposition; the United States for its own strategic interests abandoned the Shah’s side in the critical period; the military which had always been regarded as pillars of dynasty lost their role due to their declaration of neutrality.

Instead, Khomeini, leading the anti-Shah united front, seized the opportunity, made persistent efforts, and overwhelmed the Pahlavi dynasty with the strength of the people supporting him. It is because of Khomeini’s attention and reliance on the "temple class" that the Islamic Revolution achieved great success, a solid foundation, and the mass media environment. Therefore, the Islamization process after the revolution was actually the process for Khomeini further consolidating his leading position, and its more gradual development process of the political Islamic movement in Iran (Wang, 2009: 151-154). Specifically, there are two contents to establish the Islamic regime: the one is the Islamization of the political system; the other hand is the politicization of Islam system. After 1979, Khomeini appointed leaders of prayers in all towns. Therefore, prayer leaders always became the representatives of Ayatollah Khomeini in one region or the city. They led Friday prayers and made political sermons to gather believers to “smash the enemy” and “promote unity”. Under the supervision of prayer leaders, the mosque became a center to distribute rations and gather information about the region. All prayer leaders widely publicized Faqih, established Islamic government opposition to US imperialism, and exported the Islamic revolution. They promoted the youth in remote towns to whole-heartedly support the Islamic government and continuously participated into the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. In September 1984, the Secretariat of prayer leaders were formed. In October, President Khamenei praised prayer leaders as the “great pillars of the revolution, the representatives of the leaders and the powerful weapon of full mobilization”. In mobilizing people to support the government, the role of prayer leaders was even greater than the Islamic Republican Party. On March 4, 1984, Ayatollah Khomeini commissioned prayer leaders to mobilize the people to participate in the second session of the Islamic Council elections. In June 1987, President Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the
Speaker Rafsanjani wrote a joint letter to Khomeini to propose the suspension of all activities of the Islamic Republican Party. After noting the important role played by the Islamic Republican Party, the letter affirmed that the party had already had a solid foundation, and the political consciousness of the people had enabled them to protect the results of the revolution. Therefore, the party had no early advantage instead of factional disputes which would undermine the unity among the people. The Central Committee of the Party believed that stopping the activities met the interests of the revolution. Khomeini agreed. Since then, the mosque controlled by the prayer leaders became an important social organization (Wang, 2004: 365-366). In short, "before the Islamic Revolution, there was a revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini and a mass basis to be against the Shah; a wide range of loosely organized networks were formed through a variety of Islamic groups and mosques; charity fees provided some financial resources for the revolutionary activities; a distinctive revolutionary theory was formed through the preaching, lectures, and writing books; in the fight against the king, there had been the emergence of a number of revolutionary fighters who had revolutionary courage and the experience of political struggle, and who became leaders and backbones in the Islamic revolution in 1978, and then become political leaders in the future. " In other words, the mosque played an important and special role in the Khomeini revolution: organizations network, revolution funds, revolutionary theory and the backbone of the revolutionary…. Khomeini’s revolution was a revolution “from the mosque" and had first the advantage of discourse authority and public mobilization. It was a unique product of political Islam and Islamic politics.

III. The Influence of Khomeini Revolution on the Iranian Nuclear Issue

In fact, the Khomeini revolution had a profound impact on Iran’s future domestic and foreign affairs. Khomeini’s model is even equivalent to Iran’s development mode. Khomeini’s revolution also
had a real impact on domestically solving the Iranian nuclear issue, which mainly shows in the following aspects:

First, Iran's spiritual leader has a supreme religious influence and the government's political power on Iranian nuclear issues. The "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran," provides that the duties and authority of religious leaders include: the appointment of the "clergy member "in Guardian Council and the head of the Supreme Court; controlling the military by the way of appointing the military chief of staff, and Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards; the approval of the senior armed forces commanders; announcing the cease-fire and military mobilization; signing the President representation letter; having the right of recall and prerogative of mercy for prisoners as examples. It also calls upon the leaders to "be just, pious, have enough sense, courageous, organized, far-sighted and recognized and accepted by the majority of the people." According to the Iranian Constitution, the spiritual leader is the highest leader on religion and central politics and is elected by Assembly of Experts and serves for his whole life, but theoretically he can be impeached by the same meeting. Although the meeting is elected by the public, before the election, Iran's Guardian Council which is appointed by a spiritual leader would review the qualifications of candidates (Wang, 2004: 353-355). And a series of subsidiary institutions under leader authority played a very important role in ensuring the foundation of the Islamic Revolution and the authority of leaders. The combination of this leader authority and Iranian political system formed a large Faqih system, held the domestic power distribution and dominated the evolution process of Iran's political system. The Khomeini revolution is a reflection to the delayed political change in the Pahlavi dynasty. His proposal of anti-imperialist and anti-monarchy is the continuation of the process of modernization in Iran. However, the theocratic political system put new contents into Iran’s political modernization. The combination of leader authority and various power institutions formed the core of the Iran Islamic Republic. After 1989 constitutional amendment, the leader’s contradiction of political strength and religious weakness has
always been questioned from religious and secular circles. In order to protect the foundation of the Islamic Revolution and maintain their own political destiny, the important feature is political intervention of leaders. The leadership has gradually changed from the original absolute authority to a balancer of the domestic struggle. However, in the era of globalization, the absolute authority of national leaders has become no longer important, and it plays a stabilizing role in Iran politics. The contradiction between People's sovereignty and the leaders' authority would to some extent determine the progressive features of the Iran reform. (Jiang & Han, 2007).

The spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini and Islamic Revolution have had an impact on the world politics and cultural area. Although Khomeini died ten years after the Islamic Revolution and his accession to power, his Islamic political system still exists. The second generation of Supreme Leader Khamenei has been careful maintain the revolutionary regime and officials at all levels should maintain "system" as a top priority (Liang, 2007: June 7); Ayatollah Ali Khamenei followed Khomeini and participated in anti-Shah political activities under the leadership of Khomeini. He was selected as the new Iranian leader on June 4, 1989 and replaced Muhammad Ali Arlacchi in 1994 to be the 10 million Shiite Muslims' spiritual leader.

As Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei naturally tended to be conservative, but he believed that the Islamic government must make the appropriate changes to adapt to the times and Iran should be free from isolation and establish normal diplomatic relations with the western countries, which is his major difference with Ayatollah Khomeini. Therefore, when solving the Iranian nuclear issue, the international community cannot ignore the influence of the spiritual leaders Khomeini and Khamenei, and at the same time, the two leaders cannot treated simply equally. The “No East, No West, just Islamic” thought of the former affects the latter’s basic position and practice on the Iranian nuclear issue; and the latter's different cognitive understanding exacerbated the complexity as well as the possibility of the problem.

Second, the politicalizing Friday prayer and the bureaucratic
prayer leaders have already institutionalized and normalized the revolution. The diplomatic efforts and military deterrence around the Iranian nuclear issue have been mainly anti-Western activities. The thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini included four main ideas: the establishment of an Islamic government to achieve the rule of Shariah scholars; fighting against the monarchy; anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-Western and anti-secular; and exporting the Iranian Revolution to establish the Islamic world order (Liu & An, 1994: 270-274). In addition, there is anti-Zionism. These ideas set the tone of Iranian diplomats. Iran’s diplomacy used to take the output of the revolution and establishing the Islamic world order as its public goals. After the Revolution, the leaders accorded great importance to Islam and considered it as the only way to bring light to the world. Khomeini said: "Unless we return to Islam, our problems will continue to exist ... the State and Government only return to Islam to solve their problems. " "If the Muslim elite ...... follow the teachings of Islam, they could easily weaken all opposition. Muslims have everything they need; they have the world's greatest Islam... If Muslims encountered difficulties, because they do not act according to Islamic" (Amirahmadi & Entessar, 1993: 24-26).

Khomeini’s "return to Islam "at least includes: 1. the awareness of Islam should be strengthened in the country and export Islamic revolution to the world; 2. the Muslim elite should be Sharia-compliant to face the real problems; 3. the institutionalized and normalized Islamic Revolution is the way to establish the Islamic world order. Therefore, since the mosque had been used to help Khomeini to achieve the success of the Revolution, he still chose the mosque to uphold the Islamic revolutionary achievements and made his efforts to have the specific practice of the "return to Islam." Shortly after Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran, he announced the resumption of "the collective prayer on Friday". He appointed the "Friday imams" in all towns and cities as his representatives who were responsible for leading Friday prayers and making political speeches in the form of sermons, and monitoring local governments to further strengthen the religious, political, and economic role of the mosque in
the community. From a number of radical clerics, the "Friday Imam" system combines the politics and religion with unique Iranian and Islamic features which are very different from the party system in both the Eastern and Western world. The ideology is very attractive and is the ideal form of the "guardians of Faqih". Khomeini said that the “Friday Imam” is “the great pillar of the Revolution, a powerful voice of the leader and a means of mobilization.” With the increasing reliance on the “Friday Imam” to mobilize the masses, the role of the Islamic Republican Party had been eliminated and gradually disappeared (Arjomand, 1989: 167-169). It can be said that "the mullahs-mosque network has played a key role in leadership and organization to oppose the government. Thousands of mosques scattered in every city and village in Iran provide a natural and an informal nationwide network of contacts. As in the tobacco protest movement (later 19 century) and the constitutional revolution (1905), the mosque plays a role as a center to express the dissent, establish political organizations, as well as promoting and providing asylum. The government could ban political gatherings and restrictions, but it cannot shut down mosques or prohibit praying. The clergy and their students represent a huge reserve base in leadership; mosques and preaching activities become religious and political events and forums during every Friday ritual activities which “attracting thousands of faithful believers and leading political demonstrations on the way home from the temple.” (Esposito, 1999: 321).

“There is no event that better improves the dramatic power of the Islamic revival than the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution. For many people in the West and Muslim world, the unimaginable event became a reality. The powerful, modern and Western-oriented Pahlavi dynasty had been overthrown immediately. The oil-rich Iran used to build its well-equipped military power (after Israel) with its enormous wealth in the Middle East area to promote the ambitious modernization program and the White Revolution. With the assistance of the West-trained elite and consultancy, the Pahlavi dynasty ruled the country which the US considered as one of its most stable allies. However, in the name of Islam and with the support of
the Mullah-mosque network, groups which were completely irrelevant and there has been a revolution which was against the Shah and the West taking place. Many people in the Muslim world were overjoyed about this fact and they believed that it was a successful experience to follow. “No matter how much disparity the powers have, no matter how terrible rulers are, strength and victory will belong to those who are committed to change in the name of Islam” (Esposito, 1999: 285). In fact, after the Khomeini era, diplomacy and deterrence with force between Iran and the Western powers on the nuclear issue is indeed an anti-Western revolution of Iran which could be proved by the Friday prayer activities in the Tehran University. Iran's spiritual leader or the President would take this opportunity to declare Iran's domestic and foreign policy, in particular, the basic stance and attitude on Iran's peaceful possession of nuclear weapons, nuclear strike against Israel and resistance against American pressure, which is similar to the foreign ministry spokesman system. It strives to win the understanding and support of the world, especially the social elites who led by Tehran University students the understanding and support, which is a continuation of the Khomeini revolution in the new period. Therefore, the Iranian nuclear issue is indeed the continuation of the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian nuclear issue has also become an important part of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Third, the Islamic discourse used by the Iranian government could not start normal communication and exchanges with the international community both diverse and secular ones, which results in a cognitive disorganization of the international community on the nuclear issue and blocks the smooth progress of “solving the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations.”

Currently, there are four major discourses on Iranian nuclear issue in the international community:

1. The Islamic revolution discourses of complying with the doctrine and anti-Western discourse issued by the Iranian spiritual leader.

One of important reasons for the Khomeini revolution success lies in the fact that he won the positive response of different social groups.
"From the petty bourgeoisie’s view, he is not only arch-rival of the dictatorship, but also the protector of private property, traditional values and the bazaar merchants in distress; from the intellectuals’ view, although has the religious life experience, he just like the nationalists with the militant spirit who will complete the unfinished business of Mosaddeq and save the country from imperialism and despotism; from workers’ opinion, he will achieve social justice and redistribution of wealth, and transferred the power from the rich to the poor; from public opinions in the country, he will bring the land, water, electricity, roads, schools and medical institutions which is the material content the White Revolution failed to bring. For everyone, he is “a symbol of constitutional revolutionary spirit and he is entrusted with the unachieved hope.” (Abrahamian, 1982: 532). While his supporters are mainly distributed in the “Temple class” of 80,000 mosques in Iran, but "as the Shah implemented high-handed policy, under the circumstances that the secular nationalist movements, freedom movement and the left-wing People's Party had been suppressed, the religion is almost the only channel for political discontent." (Qu, 2004). Considered as an agent of Allah in the world, the Grand Ayatollah has the right to give final decisions on major controversial issues. His words and deeds are regarded as a manifestation of Allah (Arjomand, 1989: 286). That is to say, the Grand Ayatollah has the right to speak first. The Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had the paramount right to speak according to both subjective and objective reasons.

Therefore, once Khomeini made known his position, it would be considered the future development of the revolution or the policy direction of the whole country. As his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s word naturally carried weight. Even Iran's presidential election results were affected by his remarks. Similarly, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also declared the basic position time and again on the nuclear issue to the international community: on September 20, 2009, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a speech that the US-led Western countries had “false” allegations on Iran's nuclear weapons and “Iran fundamentally opposed nuclear weapons and banned the use and
production", "the ongoing uranium enrichment program is only for
the sake of citizens and for the peaceful purposes." (Khomeini, 1981).
He said that the US government was currently pursuing an "anti-Iran"
policy, so it was a lack of facts that the US with the European countries
declared Iran as having a missile threat to other countries. Khamenei
said that the West must change the current policy on Iraq and
abandon the practice of its previous hostility, or Iran would remain
"vigilant", and "would not back down"; Khamenei said on April 17,
2010 that in Islam, the use of nuclear weapons is a "taboo". The Islamic
revolution discourses of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei include: 1. Islam
prohibits the use of nuclear weapons; 2. Iran opposes and bans the
production and the use of nuclear weapons; 3. Iran has the right to
peaceful use of nuclear energy; 4. Iran is firmly opposed Western
nuclear threat.

2. The Discourse of the US-led Western powers that the rogue
states have nuclear weapons.

US President Obama changed the practice of the Bush
administration which blindly suppressed Iran. Obama also tried to
ease US-Iran relations. On the one hand, the US opposes Iran-like
countries which support Hamas and Hezbollah to have nuclear
weapons; on the other hand, the Obama Presidency held out the hand
of reconciliation to Iran: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on March 21,
2010 that "the new government and president of the United States
claimed interests on just and equitable bilateral relations. They wrote
letters to transmit information ...... claims that they are willing to
normalize relations with Iran, but in fact they are the opposite. “One
year ago, Obama sent a breakthrough message that the United States
was willing to have diplomatic contacts with Iran and open a new
chapter during the Iranian New Year, but Tehran rejected the
statement. After the Iranian presidential election in June 2009, there
had been massive protests. The authorities conducted a crackdown on
protesters, so the US-Iranian relations came to a standstill. However,
Obama once again expressed its official friendship to Iran: "Because
the Iranian government refused to fulfill its international obligations,
we are working together with the international community to make
them responsible”, and "there is no change of the proposal that we (and Iran) conduct a comprehensive diplomatic engagement and dialogue.” But Khamenei responded that the US has malicious intentions on protests of Iran opposition party, the enemies of the Iran tried to support opposition in the country and arouse civil war, but they failed.

Obama expressed the hope on March 30, 2010 that a new resolution would be reached within a few weeks and on April 13 he said that he did not want the negotiation process has prolonged for several months and hoped the international community " has bold and quick sanctions “ on the Iran nuclear issue. However, he acknowledged that China may have concerns on potential economic impact of sanctions and it is difficult to advance the negotiations. Leaders from 47 nations attended the nuclear summit in Washington which ended on the same day. Leaders expressed their will to jointly collaborate to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons. Obama believed this move would protect the United States and the world… From the above, we could see that the discourse of the US-led western powers including: 1. Iran has been secretly developing nuclear weapons; 2. The "rogue states" Iran cannot have nuclear weapons; 3. bold and swift sanctions should be taken to the Iranian nuclear issue; 4. Terrorist groups should be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons to protect the United States and the world.

3. The discourse of the International Atomic Energy Agency which suspected Iran.

The escalation of the Iran nuclear issue is also related to the verification report of the IAEA. The 9th United Nations General Assembly in 1954 passed a resolution calling for the establishment of an international institution which has oversight of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The relevant resolution took effect on July 29, 1957 to announce that the organization was established and sought to accelerate and expand atomic energy contributions to world peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The current members have 146 countries included. China joined the Agency in 1984. The Additional Protocol passed in May 1997 represents the ability of
safeguards security and the range from the only declared nuclear activities to nuclear facilities and nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency has made outstanding contributions to human peace over the years, the Agency appeared to apply multiple standards and sent the wrong messages. The Agency used to believe that Iraq had been suspected of developing nuclear weapons and the Agency had tensions with Saddam Hussein, which led to the Iraq war which has not yet fully ended today. Later, the evidence proved that Saddam Hussein did not develop nuclear weapons. North Korea, India and other countries have developed and tested nuclear weapons, but during which the IAEA did not play an active role. With the International Atomic Energy Agency reports and Khamenei's official position, the situation of the Iranian nuclear crisis has shown a highly complex state. On February 18, 2010, several European and American media reported a confidential IAEA report that: "the Intelligence shows that Iran has past or present secret development of nuclear explosive devices for missiles... mass spectrometry results show that they have the purity of 19.8% enriched uranium."

On the same day, Russia and Germany warned Iran that its controversial nuclear program would face UN sanctions. French Foreign Ministry said the IAEA’s latest report shows urgency. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on February 19 that Iran does not attempt to develop nuclear weapons, which was intended to show to Iranian nationals and the world that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons no, or even has no such idea... The above can show that the IAEA discourse includes: 1. suspicion of Iran of secretly developing nuclear weapons; 2. stopping Iran's continued uranium enrichment activities; 3. avoiding even the acquiesce of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons; 4. the emergence of multiple standard practices under pressure from the United States.

4. The discourse of Arab countries that worried Iran would export the Islamic revolution after possession of nuclear weapons.

The Arab world was first impacted after the victory of the Islamic Revolution; Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar are all the
first choices of Iran's revolution export: in the early 1980s, Iran supported radical forces in these countries and encouraged them to overthrow the government even through economic and military means to establish the Iranian model of Islamic government. Thus the region had an increasingly volatile situation. Saudi Arabia also broke the illegal occupation of Mecca Masjid by the extremist armed groups who attempted in vain to overthrow the "anti-Islamic" Saudi government. At the same time, inhabited by Shiite Muslims in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, but also the mass outbreak of anti-government riots, which once again shocked and disturbed the Saudi Government and they linked those riots to Iran's instigation. There were two attempted coups in Bahrain which had a majority of Shiite Muslims in the early 1980s. In Kuwait, the UAE, Oman and Qatar there have also appeared open or underground Islamic movements supporting the Iranian revolution against their government. Official media claimed that these turbulent activities have a direct relationship with Iran's "Islamic threat."

To this end, the six Gulf countries in 1981 established the "Gulf Cooperation Council" to strengthen their political, economic and military cooperation and coordination to response the growing crisis in the region. Therefore, there were common concerns and contradictions of the Arab States in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue: the Iraq war was bound to lead to a catastrophic regional war and affected the national security and development in the Gulf. However, the United States changed attitude toward Iran would be bound to have a nuclear Shiite country which tried to export the Islamic revolution with non-Arab property. It would result in the emergence of a new regional political structure: during the checks and balances, two nuclear non-Arab countries (Israel and Iran) squeezing Sunni Muslim forces. When he accepted the interview from the Middle East Economics magazine on November 5, 2006, IAEA Deputy Director General Taniguchi said that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have expressed interests in the development of civil nuclear power. The IAEA had launched a consultation with their governments and would help these countries build nuclear facilities
according to the relevant provisions of the IAEA. Clearly, those nations determining to develop nuclear technology have certain relationships both with Israel and Iran. These countries may believe that if they were able to master advanced nuclear technology, they would have security against nuclear threat. The Arab discourse includes: 1. Concerns with the export of Islamic revolution; 2. Worry about Iran’s ambitions of regional hegemony; 3. fears of the nuclear structure which only Arab countries have no nuclear capacity; 4. mastery of advanced nuclear technology in order to establish the safety and security against nuclear threats.

**IV. Conclusion**

President Hu Jintao met US President Obama on April 12, 2010 and underscored the Chinese stance on Iran's nuclear issue: China has always been committed to safeguarding the international non-proliferation regime and the Middle East peace and stability and hopes that all parties would continue to increase foreign efforts to actively seek a negotiated settlement through dialogue and an effective way to solve the Iranian nuclear issue. Hu Jintao indicated that China is ready to maintain communication and coordination with the United States and other parties in those countries as well as the UN and other channels. In the "actively seeking a negotiated settlement through dialogue and effective way to the Iranian nuclear issue", China should address the coexistence of these four discourses and cognitive discrepancy on Iranian nuclear issue and the fact that these discourses influenced Iranian external dialogue and communicate. The basic path to solve the Iranian nuclear issue in general should be: to reach consensus with each other →to develop appropriate measures →to take concrete actions →to gradual resolve the Iran issue → try to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.

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